








Join the Union and be Safe; The Effects of Unionisation on Occupational Safety and Health in the European Union


Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of unionisation on occupational safety and health (OSH), as measured by the fatal and non-fatal work accidents, after controlling for the country GDP. It uses a panel sample of 10 European Union countries, for the period 1982-2006. The study takes into account the time persistence in work injuries and the endogenous nature of the work injuries – union density relationship, by using GMM regression models to control for endogeneity. In addition, the effect of union density is decomposed into a temporary and permanent effect. It is shown that increasing union density is associated with a decrease in the number of both fatal and non-fatal work injuries. These findings have important implications for the design of OHS and industrial relations policies.
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Health and safety at the workplace is a significant determinant of the well-being of the employed population. Although work injuries exhibit downward trends the last decade, they still cause significant economic, social and emotional costs to the employees’ involved and negative externalities to their families as well (European Agency for Health and Safety at Work, 2001). In particular, the economic costs of work-related injuries and diseases, reflected in reduced productivity and output, are estimated at 4% of the worldwide GDP (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2010), while the non-pecuniary costs and the negative externalities to the victims’ families are also considered to be significant (Boden, 2005).
An increasing literature focuses on the workplace health practices, institutions and norms that may affect OSH (occupational safety and health). Labour unions play an important role towards the improvement of OSH (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2010). While theory postulates that unions contribute in numerous ways towards the enhancement of OSH, the empirical evidence provide  conflicting findings regarding the role of unionisation on workplace safety (Morantz, 2013).
The present study revisits this issue by investigating the effect of unionisation on work-related injury rates using a panel of ten European Union countries during the period 1982-2006. The degree of unionisation is approximated by the union density index. Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) regression models are estimated in order to control for group-wise heteroskedasticity and cross-panel correlation. In addition, as a robustness check and in order to take into account the time persistence in work injuries and the endogenous nature of the work injuries – unionisation relationship, GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) regression techniques are utilised. The regression results show that both fatal and non-fatal work injuries tend to decrease as union density increases, indicating the protective role of unions on occupational safety and health. 
The next section (Section 2) provides a literature review survey on the conflicting evidence regarding the role of unions on OSH. Section 3 presents the variables utilised in the analysis and Section 4 provides details on the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results and finally, Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review
The literature indicates that labor unions use their political influence and engage actively through collective bargaining, representation in health and safety committees and the undertaking of relevant actions, in enhancing workplace safety (Donado, 2007). In addition, unions can promote OSH educational activities, disseminate OSH information to workers and contribute to the enforcement and implementation of OSH regulations (Morantz, 2013). Theory predicts that unions contribute to the improvement of working conditions, obtain higher compensation benefits for employees who suffered work-related health problems, and in general, represent effectively the employees’ interests regarding health and safety at the workplace (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Freeman, 1994; Hirsch et al., 1997; Morse et al., 2003). However, empirical studies often fail to support these hypotheses. Boal (2009) in a similar study for the US coal mine industry, found evidence that the negative relationship between unionism and workplace fatalities is mainly driven by the “efficient-bargaining” model of union behavior, namely workers bargain and succeed in enjoying safer working conditions. However, other possible paths through which unionism might affect workplace injuries are also suggested in the literature. Since union presence is associated with higher fringe and compensation benefits receipts (Hirsch et al., 1997) and higher wages, it is possible that union members may be more prone in exchanging higher wages for lower workplace safety (Donado, 2007). 
Many studies find that in industries with strong unionisation presence, work injuries appear to be lower in comparison to industries with weaker union presence (Donado, 2007). Siebert and Wei (1994) provide evidence that unionised workers experience lower fatal injury rates. A more recent study of Litwin (2000) found that the presence of unions in the British labour market contribute to the reduction of work injuries. Nichols et al. (2007) argued that unionisation can reduce work injuries through the participation of union members in health and safety committees at the workplace. The above findings are in line with Reilly et al. (1991), who show that lower injury rates are observed in plants where union representatives participate in the occupational safety and health committees compared to the remainder.
Several studies provide empirical evidence in favour of a positive relationship between unionisation, work-related injuries and absenteeism (Fishback, 1986; Leigh, 1981; Veliziotis, 2010). One explanation for the observed positive relationship is the presence of endogeneity. It seems that while increased unionisation affects workplace injuries, at the same time riskier industries are more unionised, since higher accidents rates may motivate workers to organise in unions in order to protect themselves from the hazardous working conditions (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Nichols et al., 2007). Indeed, the evidence indicates that workers who face increased hazards at work exhibit increased participation in union activities, as a response to the hazardous job conditions (Hirsch and Berger, 2001; Robinson, 1990).  
Furthermore, many studies argue that the report rate of work injuries is higher in workplaces with strong union presentation and such an effect can bias upwards the effects of unionisation on injury rates (Donado, 2007; Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Morse et al., 2003; Nichols et al., 2007). Fenn and Ashby (2004) provide corroborating evidence indicating that the higher is the proportion of unionised workers in an establishment, the higher would be the risk of reported injuries or illnesses. They argue that highly unionised enterprises show high reporting of injuries at work, since they enjoy higher compensation due to the union representation. Towards this end, Morantz (2013) finds that unionisation is associated with a large decrease in traumatic injuries and overall fatalities in the coal mine industry for the USA. However, she also reports higher total and non-traumatic injury rates, which is attributed to the higher reporting rates in the unionized industries. In addition to the above, Donado (2007) attributes the observed increased work injury rates in unionised sectors to behavioral issues to the workers involved, since they tend to underestimate the true job hazards, and thus experience higher work accident rates. All in all, it seems that up-to-date literature has not provided conclusive evidence on the role of unions upon OSH, thus further research is needed to shed more light on this issue. 

3. The Dataset
The data used in this study is a panel of 10 European Union countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK) for the time period 1982-2006. Data on fatal and non-fatal work accidents and employee population are drawn from the International Labour Organization (ILO) database (LABORSTA). The ILO database contains a great variety of information regarding labour market characteristics for numerous countries and years. The variables to be explained are therefore​[1]​:  

-	Total fatal injury rates per 100,000 employees
-	Total non-fatal injury rates per 100,000 employees
	
-	The independent variable of interest is the Union densityand 
-	GDP per capita (in PPP) which enters as a control variable to capture the level of economic performance of the country.

	Since numerous studies (Boone and van Ours, 2002; Davies et al., 2009; Catalano, 1979; Sasaki, 2010; Steele, 1974; Ussif, 2004) show that occupational accidents and injuries rates are affected by the macroeconomic conditions and the business cycle, a proxy for these conditions (real GDP per capita) is included in the regressions. The data on real GDP per capita are derived from the European Database ‘Health for All’ of the World Health Organization (WHO). Data on trade union density (the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members divided by the total number of wage and salary earners) are drawn from the Annual Labour Force Statistics of the OECD database. 
	As Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2013) argue, work-related accidents are attributed to both the individual employee characteristics and the overall economic and socio-cultural climate. For example, working hours are among the most commonly met determinants of work-related injuries (Souza et al., 2014). Towards this end, information on country unemployment rates, the average annual hours worked per worker and the annual growth rate of unit labour cost are drown from the OECD Statistics database. Average years of schooling for individuals of 15 years and older are drawn from the Barro-Lee database. The values are available every five years therefore the in-between values are calculated by linear interpolation. To examine the sensitivity of the results a number of covariates are introduced into the models, as follows:

-	Country Unemployment Rates
-	Average Years of Schooling
-	Hours of Work
-	Unit Labour Cost (Annual Growth Rate)
	
		Finally, the instrumental variable used to control for the endogenous relationship between work injuries and union density, is the “days lost due to strikes and lockouts per 100,000 employees” and the information is drawn from the International Labour Organization (ILO) database (LABORSTA). The summary statistics of the variables included in the regressions are shown in Table 1. 

4. Econometric Methodology
The following Random Effects models are utilised:  

               (1)

    (2)

The subscripts i and t denote the country and the year period respectively,  is the country-specific random-effects intercepts and  is the year dummies variables. It is assumed that  and the  are independent. Equations (1) and (2) are estimated with FGLS. The advantage of using FGLS is that this methodology takes into account the existence of both groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. It is appropriate to assume that the common European legislations on health and safety at work will affect work injuries across the countries under examination. As Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2002) argue, if there is cross-panel correlation then the FGLS estimator is more efficient.
In addition, the Mundlak (1978) methodology is utilised as follows:

             
 (1)
                                                                                                           
               (2)

The Mundlak (1978) methodology offers a simple and straightforward way to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary effect of union density upon work-related fatalities and injuries. In particular,  is the mean union density for each country and it is the permanent effect. The term   captures the temporary effect, namely the deviations from the country average union density. Both FGLS models and FGLS models with Mundlak decomposition are re-estimated with the inclusion of more independent regressors, in order to check the sensitivity of the results.
Two methodological shortcomings are addressed. First the dynamic nature of work-related injuries is taken into account. This is an implication of the fact that the experience of a work related health problem at present may be affected by work related health condition suffered in the past. For example, musculoskeletal disorders are found to be the most frequently experienced work-related health problem in the European Union countries. After the onset of a musculoskeletal disorder (for example, low back pain) due to working conditions there is a high probability of recurrence of this problem (De Beeck and Hermans, 2000). Second, the endogenous nature of the relationship between trade union density and work injuries should be controlled for in order to derive unbiased estimates. Both the dynamic relationship and endogeneity issues can be accounted for by the use of GMM models. 
	The Arellano and Bond (1991) first differenced GMM estimator estimates equations (1) and (2) after introducing lagged values of the dependent variable and first differencing the variables in order to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. The first differenced equation uses as instruments the past values of union density. However, past union density should continue to affect the growth rate of work injuries at subsequent years through the union’s actions regarding occupational health and safety policies and framework. 
	Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that the system GMM estimator is improved in terms of efficiency in comparison to the differenced GMM estimator, since the lagged variables in levels may be weak instruments for the differenced equation. In line with the above, the main model utilised in this study is the two-step system GMM estimator (the equations (1) and (2) respectively) to obtain the following system of two equations (one in differences, as in the differenced GMM estimator and one in levels) for fatal and non-fatal work injuries ( denotes the difference operator)​[2]​:

      
(3)

                                                                                                                                               
(4)
	
The above systems of equations for fatal work injuries (3) and non-fatal work injuries (4) respectively, are estimated using the two-step system GMM estimator. This estimator is considered to be more efficient than the differenced GMM estimator, since it uses as instruments the lagged differences of union density for the equation in levels and the lagged levels of union density for the equation in differences. The lagged values of  and so on, are assumed to be valid instruments for the first differenced equation. 
Donado (2007) also utilised GMM regression models to examine the endogenous nature of work injuries – unionisation, by using as identifying restrictions the past values of union indicators on the assumption that union OSH actions exert an effect on work injuries at subsequent years. In order to improve the performance of our models, the variable “days lost due to strikes and lockouts per 100,000 employees” is also included as an instrumental variable. This indicator of union activities related to strikes and lockouts is found consistently to affect trade union density in existing research (Lesch, 204). However, there is no a priori reason to expect that strike activity is related to work-related injuries. 
	In addition, the Sargan test is also used in order to check for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests are also presented since there should not be any evidence of second-order serial correlation while first-order serial correlation is expected in the model of first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The GMM methodology is recommended for "small T, large N" panels (Roodman, 2009). However, the dataset used in this study provides a small number of countries. Hence, the GMM estimation is used as a robustness check for the FGLS specification which is the main specification in this study.

5. Regression Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest at country level. Fatal injury rates per 100,000 workers vary greatly across countries. Sweden exhibits the lowest rate with only 0.28 work related fatalities per 100,000 workers. Spain faces a high incidence of work-related fatalities (8.38 per 100,000 workers) and of non-fatal work injuries (5,026.84 per 100,000 workers). The lowest incidence for non-fatal work injuries is observed for the UK (632.91 non-fatal work injuries per 100,000 workers). Union density also varies across countries with the lowest participation observed for France (10%) and the highest for Sweden (81%).
	Figures 1-3 show the mean fatal and non fatal work injury rates and union density rates for the countries included in the sample. A downward trend is observed for all three series. The mean rate of work-related fatalities exhibits a greater volatility throughout the period 1982-2005, and it has a similar pattern to the mean of non-fatal work injuries. Interestingly, both series exhibit a sharp increase in the middle to late 1980’s and they drop afterwards. The mean union density rates are declining from 1982 up to 2005, with a sharp increase in the 1990-1995 period.

Fatal work injuries
	The results for the FGLS models and the system GMM estimator for fatal and non-fatal work injuries are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Table 2 presents the regression results for fatal work injury rates for 100,000 workers in the period 1982-2005. In the first column of Table 2 (Model 1), the results from the FGLS effects model are presented, and the second column (Table 2, Model 2) presents the FGLS Mundlak decomposition model results. The third column (Table 2, Model 3) presents the system-GMM results when endogeneity and time dependence is taken into account. In this first set of models only GDP per capita is included as a regressor apart from union density.
	The findings indicate that increasing union density is associated with a decreasing incidence of fatal work-related injuries. The results are in accordance with the GMM results (which are used to evaluate the robustness of the estimates). The results do not change when the union density effect is decomposed into a temporary and the permanent effect. Both the temporary and the permanent effect of union density on OSH are statistically significant. All in all, an increase in union density is associated with a lower rate of fatal work injuries. This implies that increasing union density helps unions to achieve better outcomes on occupational health and safety conditions. 
	The findings regarding the impact of union density upon work-related fatalities remain unaltered when more covariates are introduced in the models to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to variations in specification. Models 4 and 5 of Table 2, extend the regression Models 1 and 2 by including more regressors in the models. The impact of increasing union density upon work-related fatalities remains strong but the temporary effect of union density becomes statistically insignificant in this case (Model 5), whereas a permanent negative effect of union density upon work-related fatalities is retained. This last finding is in line with the conventional wisdom since it is expected that the action of unions towards the decrease of work-related fatalities takes some time to manifest itself.
	Regarding the effects of the control variables, the effect of per capita GDP upon fatal work injuries is not straightforward. The sign of the relationship between per capita GDP and work-related fatalities reverses when more covariates are added to the models. When adding more covariates to the models (Models 4 and 5) economic upturns are associated with an increase in work-related fatalities. In addition, during increasing unemployment work-related fatalities increase. The remaining covariates hold the expected signs. An increase in average schooling is associated with a decrease in work-related fatalities. Similarly, an increase in hours of work and the labour cost is associated with an increase in work-related fatalities.

Non-fatal work injuries
	The findings are similar when one considers the effect of union density upon non-fatal work injuries (Table 3, Models 1-5). Increasing union density is associated with reduced non-fatal work injury rates (Model 1). This finding is also supported by the GMM estimations (Model 3).  The Mundlak decomposition reveals only a permanent effect of union density upon non-fatal work-related injuries, while the temporary effect is insignificant (Model 2). In the augmented models, the effect of union density upon work-related injuries remains strong and negative (Model 4). The inclusion of more covariates in the Mundlak decomposition models cause  the temporary effect to become significant whereas the permanent effect becomes statistically insignificant (Model 5).
	Regarding the effects of the GDP which serves as a control variable, the augmented models (Models 4 and 5), show that an increase in non-fatal work injuries is observed during economic recessions. The results on the effect of unemployment rates are similar, indicating that during periods of rising unemployment, non-fatal work injury rates tend to increase. As expected, increasing average hours of work and increasing labor cost is associated with increasing non-fatal work injuries.

6. Conclusions 
The empirical evidence on the effects of unions on occupational health and safety is ambiguous. Some studies report a negative relationship between union activity and fatal or non-fatal workplace injuries (Siebert and Wei, 1994, Litwin, 2000) whereas other studies find a positive relationship (Donado, 2007; Fishback, 1986). The literature suggests that this ambiguity may be an outcome of the endogeneity bias (Hirsch and Berger, 2001; Robinson, 1990, Fenn and Ashby, 2004). 
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the effects unionisation, upon fatal and non fatal work accidents for ten European Union countries after controlling for the effects of endogeneity. The level of unionisation is approximated by the union density rates. The study utilises FGLS models and system-GMM models which take into account the endogeneity on the work injuries-union density relationship and the dynamic character of work injuries. The findings are consistent across the different specification models indicating that union density is conducive to reducing fatal and non-fatal injuries at the workplace. For fatal work-related injuries, there is a significant permanent effect of union density on OSH, indicating that unionionisation has a constructive impact on occupation safety in the long-run. For the non-fatal work-related injuries there is transitory positive effect of unionisation on OSH. The above difference in the effects is due to the nature of fatal and non-fatal work injuries. It is consistent with the findings of other studies which have found differences in the effect of unionisation upon fatal and non-fatal work injuries (Donado, 2007). One might expect that union OSH activities may act preventively or may deter more serious work injuries that lead to fatalities. In addition, if a large part of non-fatal work injuries may be attributed to individual predisposition characteristics (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2010) then the impact of union presence upon them may be more restrictive in this case.  
The augmented regression models suggest that during periods of economic upturns, as suggested by increasing per capita GDP, fatal work injuries increase but non-fatal work injuries decrease. Only a few studies address the cyclicality of workplace injuries and the majority of them propose that injury rates are procyclical, due to the increased effort and working hours exerted during periods of economic upturn (Boone et al., 2011; Shea, 1990). This hypothesis is supported the findings of this study for fatal work injuries only. Other studies attribute this positive relationship to the hiring of new workers in economic upturns, who seem to have higher injury risks due to inexperience (Davies and Jones, 2009). The present study does not provide evidence in favour of the existence of a reporting bias, namely that workers are more prone in reporting work injuries during periods of economic growth due to lower concerns of job loss (Boone and van Ours, 2006). However, other effects may operate and affect the relationship between economic conditions and workplace injuries, such as behavioral changes by workers (Butler, 2011). For example, during periods of rising unemployment, workers may experience increased pressure and they might become more prone in undertaking hazardous job tasks in order to avoid job loss. This hypothesis is supported by the impact of unemployment exerts upon work injuries, ceteris paribus. Indeed, increasing unemployment rates are associated with increasing fatal and non-fatal work injuries. All in all, economic conditions can greatly affect worker behavior and risk-undertaking activities at the workplace. 
The control  covariates hold the expected signs. Investment in human capital is associated with lower fatal work injuries. The effect of schooling is not significant in the case of non-fatal workplace injuries. Human capital investment is associated with less risky job environments and increased awareness of OSH behaviours and risks. Similarly, an increase in average hours of work and an increase in unit labour cost are both associated with an increase in fatal and non-fatal workplace injuries. Both these effects are intuitive since an increase in effort is expected to increase workplace injuries. In addition, an increase in labour cost may induce employers to cut down on OSH measures in the workplace in order to reduce labour costs.
	Overall, the results of this study indicate that unionisation is an important factor in improving occupational health and safety since increased union membership improves OSH conditions at the workplace through various mechanisms (efficient bargaining, OSH monitoring and implementation, participation in OSH committees and the like). The empirical findings have broad implications for workplace safety, since they identify the relative importance of unions on workplace safety. This is an important policy issue especially in the current state of affairs where there is a trend of declining union participation and there are high  economic and social costs of workplace injuries. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

               CountryVariables	Austria	Denmark	Finland 	France 	Ireland 
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
Fatal Injury Rates per 100,000 employees	4.95	1.64	2.76	0.89	2.64	0.68	4.02	1.19	3.26	1.63




Average Years of Schooling	8.39	0.61	9.71	0.15	8.83	0.60	8.22	1.22	10.71	0.25
Average Hours of Work	1816.29	19.22	1575.75	33.48	1770.96	34.73	1597.75	69.32	1861.63	126.23
Annual Growth Rate of Unit Labor Cost (%)	0.74	2.74	2.88	2.33	2.80	3.65	2.45	2.81	3.61	3.59
               CountryVariables	Italy 	Portugal	Spain 	Sweden 	UK
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
Fatal Injury Rates per 100,000 employees	5.87	1.06	6.68	2.78	8.38	2.44	0.28	0.18	1.14	0.49




Average Years of Schooling	8.08	0.72	6.87	0.52	7.84	1.32	10.54	0.61	8.40	0.39
Average Hours of Work	1861.54	17.90	1885.31	78.81	1746.04	35.51	1590.21	46.70	1727.54	32.83
Annual Growth Rate of Unit Labor Cost (%)	4.73	4.42	8.85	6.73	5.23	3.19	3.35	3.54	3.81	3.19




Figure 1. Changes in Mean Fatal Work Injury Rates Over Time, 1982-2005.

Figure 2. Changes in Mean Non-Fatal Work Injury Rates Over Time, 1985-2006.






Table 2. The Effect of Unionisation on Fatal Work Injuries, 1982-2005
                                                                    Dependent                                     VariableIndependentVariables	Fatal Injuries
	FGLS,Model 1	FGLS,Mundlak decomposition, Model 2	System GMMModel 3	FGLS,Model 4	FGLS Mundlak decomposition, Model 5
GDP per capita	-0.0002 *(-13.59)	-0.0002 *(-8.86)	0.0001(0.14)	0.00004 *(1.98)	0.00004 **(1.83)
Union Density (%)	-0.056 *(-27.26)(0.67)	-	-0.344 *(-1.97)	-0.009 *(-3.19)(0.67)	-
Temporary Union Density	-	-0.032 *(-4.39)	-	-	-0.018(-1.26)
Permanent Union Density	-	-0.059 *(-26.74)	-	-	-0.009 *(-2.96)
Fatal Injuriest-1	-	-	0.222(0.61)	-	-
Country UR (%)	-	-	-	0.189 *(11.59)	0.191 *(10.92)
Average Years of Schooling	-	-	-	-1.207 *(-15.11)	-1.202 *(-15.21)
Average Hours of Work	-	-	-	0.003 *(6.63)	0.003 *(6.59)
Annual Growth Rate of Unit Labor Cost (%)	-	-	-	0.103 *(5.93)	0.103 *(5.76)








* indicates statistical significance for p<0.05 and ** indicates significance for p<0.10. Robust standard errors are calculated. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Probabilities are reported for AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan test.
Table 3. The Effect of Unionisation on Non-Fatal Work Injuries, 1985-2006
                                                                    Dependent                                     VariableIndependentVariables	Non-Fatal Injuries
	FGLS,Model 1	FGLS,Mundlak decomposition, Model 2	System GMMModel 3	FGLS,Model 4	FGLS Mundlak decomposition, Model 5
GDP per capita	0.0000 *(3.36)	0.0000 *(6.00)	-0.047 *(-2.63)	-0.0000 *(-3.63)	-0.00001 *(-3.77)
Union Density (%)	-35.441 *(-27.07)(0.67)	-	-0.030 **(-1.63)	-9.849 **(-1.77)(0.67)	-
Temporary Union Density	-	11.025(0.87)	-	-	-56.849 *(-2.78)
Permanent Union Density	-	-36.621 *(-23.60)	-	-	-2.152(-0.40)
Fatal Injuriest-1	-	-	-0.365(-0.55)	-	-
Country UR (%)	-	-	-	48.874 *(2.62)	70.880 *(3.60)
Average Years of Schooling	-	-	-	35.681(0.34)	140.926(1.25)
Average Hours of Work	-	-	-	6.930 *(7.18)	8.976 *(8.76)
Annual Growth Rate of Unit Labor Cost (%)	-	-	-	67.431 *(2.96)	89.842 *(3.65)








* indicates statistical significance for p<0.05 and ** indicates significance for p<0.10. Robust standard errors are calculated. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 




^1	  Data on fatal and non-fatal injuries disaggregated by industrial sector are also available at ILO database. Unfortunately, the increased missing values on the employee population per industry and union density, did not allow exploitation of this information. Data can be retrieved from: http://laborsta.ilo.org/ 
^2	  The system of equations also includes control for the time trend variable. Alternative estimation models with year dummies were also utilised but the models presented indicated a better fit, due to the strong collinearity of the year dummies with the independent variables.
